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MR. JUSTICE MuRPn]: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By J. Woodford Howard.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 578. $12.50.
ARTHIUR SELVWYN MILLER*
Adamson v. California1 was decided in 1947. Since overruled by the Warren
Court, it became immediately famous because of a contentious debate between
Justices Black and Frankfurter. Black would have had the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment "incorporate" all of the substantive provisions of
the Bill of Rights-in this instance the federal standard of the fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination. Black accused his brethren in the majority
of reading their ideas of "natural law" into the Constitution. This, as is well
known, infuriated Frankfurter, who maintained that Black's history (about the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment) was faulty, and that "due process" did
not give the Justices a warrant to roam at large, placing their ideas of good
social policy (natural law) into the Constitution. Votaries of the cult of Frank-
furter worship leaped into the battle to write long and (to them) convincing
accounts of how the former Harvard law professor was indubitably correct.
Little noticed in the fray, perhaps because the Black position was itself so
extreme, was the brief and pointed dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Francis
William Murphy, who, for some reason, was always called Frank Murphy. In
that dissent, Murphy anticipated the tenor and swing of the decisions of the
Warren Court, saying, Justice Black is probably correct in saying that the
fourteenth amendment does include all of the substantive provisions of the
Bill of Rights but he does not go far enough. Those, said Murphy, are the
minimal guarantees of the Constitution; in addition, there are certain unnamed
constitutional rights which the Justices could identify and protect in appro-
priate cases. A little over twenty years after Adamson, Black had been vindi-
cated (in large part) by the Supreme Court-and, what is even more important,
so too had Frank Murphy. Murphy's statement in Adamson had become law
in certain areas: "I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But I am not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so
short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant con-
stitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of
a specific provision in the Bill of Rights."'2
The essential debate here concerns the nature of the judicial function in
constitutional matters. Professor Howard's biography is the first full-scale treat-
ment of one of the most maligned (and underestimated) Justices in the history
of the Supreme Court. Just as the decisions of the Warren Court in large part
* Professor of Law, The National Law Center, The George Washington University.
1. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
2. Id. at 124.
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vindicated Justice John Marshall Harlan-I, so too did the same Court place the
judicial imprimatur on a number of positions that Murphy, all alone (or almost
so) and unafraid, had staked out during his brief decade on the High Bench in
the 1940's. But while the first Harlan is now celebrated by bench and bar,
Murphy remains forgotten. Perhaps Howard's fine biography of an avowedly
instrumentalist Justice will help to resurrect his reputation.
Why Murphy should have been and still is so derided and ignored merits
attention. Howard mentions and develops the question in what, for students of
the Supreme Court, are the finest chapters of a fine biography. He quotes a
number of contemporary commentators. For example, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr. called him "tense, dramatic, self-intoxicated," a judge who had "a semi-
mystical urge toward isolated positions"; C. Herman Pritchett thought that
Murphy illustrated how "hyperactive concern for individual rights can lead a
judge into ventures little short of quixotic." But it was Philip B. Kurland, a
member of the cult of Frankfurter worshippers, who took the most critical posi-
tion; speaking of Murphy and Chief Justice Fred Vinson, he opined: "Neither
had any great intellectual capacity. Both were absolutely dependent upon their
law clerks for the production of their opinions. Both were very much concerned
with their place in history, though neither had any feeling for the history of the
Court as an institution .... Each had desires for a non-judicial role in govern-
ment. Neither dealt with the cases presented as complex problems: for each
there was only one issue which forced decision. Each felt a very special loyalty
to the President who had appointed him. Both were more impressed with the
office which they held than with the function they were called upon to per-
form." 3 That is the indictment: Murphy is accused of being a "political" judge
who failed to follow the dictates of "sovereign reason" in his decision-making.
What Murphy perceived, seemingly instinctively, was a shore dimly seen:
the fact that the Court was then, had always been, and still is a very special
type of Court, one that makes "political" decisions in a "legal" context.
Murphy's error-if error it was-was in failing to conform to the accepted image
of a judge. As Howard says, "he subordinated ideas to ideology, legal reasoning
to emotion, and appeared thereby as the epitome of a 'lawless' judge."4 He was,
"by word and deed, . . . the most radical Justice in the nation's history."' ' The
way of a radical is never easy, particularly if that radicalism exists within a
profession that almost by definition (law being the conserving force of any
society) is given over to conservatism. The accusation that Murphy lacked
proper "judicial temperatment" presupposes an ideal model of the judge; indeed
it presupposes a person who never existed, if, for example, one were to believe
Chief Justice John Marshall, who said: "Courts are mere instruments of the





mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to
follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the
will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." 6 Justice Frankfurter, the
idol of what William James and Morris R. Cohen called the "intellectualists,"
often discussed the requisites of the judicial temperament, but was not himself
immune from the pulls and tugs that sway mortal men. For example, he could
speak of the need for "invincible disinterestedness" on the part of a Justice,
while simultaneously and steadfastly voting to uphold a given ideological position
such as the need for Executive power in wartime7 or the principle of federalism
as he saw it.8 Howard documents this.
Frankfurter, despite his powerful mental capacity, fundamentally miscon-
ceived the role and function of the Supreme Court during the second half of his
long tenure on the High Bench. He sat in Holmes' seat, and seemingly thought
of himself as another Holmes-acting as a sort of schoolmaster, spinning
aphorisms that will not last, bucking the tide of history. At a time when the
issues facing the Court were basically different from the economic-policy ques-
tions that plagued the Justices during Holmes' time, he held staunchly and
steadfastly to a position of self-styled "judicial self-restraint." One of the
many myths about the supreme tribunal is that Frankfurter could and actually
did adhere to such a position; he, too, had his preferences and values, which he
sought to further. 9 I do not suggest that Murphy had a fully developed phi-
losophy of judicial action in nearly the extent to which his colleague and foe
did. Murphy was cut in the Earl Warren mold; he saw the complexities of
Supreme Court cases in rather simplistic either-or dichotomies. A visceral judge,
he asked the Warren question--"Was it fair?"--and came to decisions that
have since won the approval of a majority of the Court.
Subtitled "a political biography," Howard's book is an account of a politi-
cal judge who sat on a political court. His error, if error it be, or great sin, if sin
it be, was to let the long-hidden cat out of the bag: He openly and avowedly,
even defiantly, was a "gut" reactor who espoused frankly instrumentalist posi-
tions. Not that he couldn't write opinions with the deftness and opacity that so
delights lawyers, because that language is familiar and permits lawyers a range
of maneuver within only broadly denoted lines; that he did, and often, as
Howard notes (but as Murphy's critics refuse to concede). He could have been
the very model of the traditional jurist-grave, solemn, a bit pompous, unclear
6. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).
7. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
8. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
9. Compare Grant, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: A Dissenting Opinion, 12 U.C.LA L.
REv. 1013, (1965) with Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 27 U. Cm. L. Rav. 661 (1960), and Miller, Some Pervasive Myths About the
United States Supreme Court, 10 ST. Louis UL.J. 153 (1965).
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in language but giving the appearance of adherence to "the law"-but he chose
not to (or perhaps he had the role thrust upon him). What his judicial career
so clearly illustrates is the need to perceive the Supreme Court of the United
States as a political organ, a policy-maker in the American system of govern-
nance. Of course, much lip service is given to that notion, but little has been
done to examine its permutations. Legal scholars, for the most part, have been
content to parse opinions of Supreme Court Justices without making systematic
and comprehensive reference to either the inputs of the adjudicative process or
the outcomes (in the sense of "impact analysis" of Court decisions).
The time has now come-indeed it is long past due-for something more
by way of studying that particular and peculiar institution, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution. Law school courses in Constitutional Law can no longer be
confined largely to scrutiny of what the Justices have had to say. For what is
now being seen, mainly through the efforts of political scientists, is the political
dimension of American constitutionalism. Casebooks in current use simply do
not provide the data, qualitatively or quantitatively, necessary to an under-
standing of the Court and the Constitution. The great value of the book under
review is that it reveals, in considerable detail, some of what takes place be-
hind the velvet curtains of the Marble Palace. Howard's exposition will rank
with Alpheus Thomas Mason's great biography of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone for its revelations of the internal working of the Court during the 1940's.
Mason's book was criticized by some reviewers for being too candid about the
Court; the same problem troubled Howard, because he used Murphy's notes of
secret judicial conferences and intra-Court memoranda. "Some lawyers," he said,
"believe the public has no legitimate interest in judicial decisions beyond pub-
lished opinions. Personally, I believe the public in a democracy has a right to
know how its judges decide cases, and I share the view expressed by Charles
Evans Hughes and others that knowledge of how courts operate would vin-
dicate popular respect for the judiciary."'1
In sum, Professor Howard's book is necessary reading (together with
Mason's biography of Stone) for anyone who would understand the Supreme
Court decisions of the 1930's and '40's. It tells much, but not all; it adds a de-
gree of understanding about the operations of the Court that is not obtainable
elsewhere. With its publication, students of the High Bench should await, im-
patiently and eagerly, biographies of Jackson and Frankfurter-those two giants
of the anti-Murphy clique-and (eventually) of Warren and Black and Douglas.
10. P. viii.
